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As políticas económicas implementadas em Portugal no período 1945-1973 
foram condicionadas pelo enquadramento institucional criado pelo Estado 
Novo a partir do início dos anos 30, pela conjuntura económica da guerra e 
pela evolução e meios de integração da economia portuguesa na ordem 
económica internacional  do período. 
Em comparação com outras economias da Europa Ocidental, as políticas 
económicas conjunturais foram receosas, as políticas de crescimento, os meios 








The economic policies implemented in Portugal during the period 1945-1973 
were conditioned by the institutional framework created by the Estado Novo 
since the beginning of 1930s, by the economic environment of the Second 
World War, and by the evolution of the integration of the Portuguese economy 
in the international economic order of the period. 
Short-term macroeconomic policies were mild in comparison with other 
Western Europe experiences.  
Structural policies, in terms of growth, the means to achieve it and its 
performance, followed the Western European trend. In what concerns the 
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"If corporatism is inseparable from this system of 
contingencies - where industrialists march with a rhythm like a 
regiment, where coordination is as rigid as a strikle - I detach 
myself from everything I have just written in its defense."  
 








It is usually considered that the economic role of the State encompasses two independent 
strands: that of provider of public goods, which corresponds to its traditional role in the economic 
sphere, and that of responsible for the definition and implementation of economic policy. In this 
latter, most recent, strand, it is also usual to distinguish, on one hand, the intervention with short-
term macroeconomic purposes from the intervention with structural objective and, on  the  other 
hand, the intervention at the level of demand from the intervention at the level of supply.  
The purpose of this paper is precisely that of identifying the fundamental characteristics of the 
economic role of the Portuguese state - and to assess its impact on the economic system - during 
the first three decades after the end of the second world war; that is, during the period in which the 
Portuguese economy achieved sustained growth2, recorded a very low rate of unemployment with 
external equilibrium, and, if we exclude the latter years of the period, with price stability.  
 
 
2. Factors conditioning the economic policy after the War 
 
Among the factors conditioning the economic policy of the Estado Novo 3 during the period 
under analysis, we must consider, because of its impact and/or durability, the institutional 
framework, the economic environment of the Second World War, and the degree and the means of 
integration of the Portuguese economy in the international economic order of that period.  
________________________ 
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the conference Portugal and Europe - 50 years of integration held in 
Lisbon in May 1995. 
2 Unquestionably, the greatest cumulative average annual rate of growth of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
Portuguese history was reached during this period with approximately 5.5%, without having recorded a negative rate of 
growth in any single year. During the second greatest period of growth, 1974-1990, a rate of approximately 3% was 
recorded. See MATA; VALÉRIO: 1994. 
3 Term applied to the regime installed in 1933 by their own founders, whose main characteristics would actually prevail till 
1974. 





2.1. The institutional framework 
 
The economic policy of the first half of the period under analysis, which gave expression to 
the process of economic development, as well as the means used to its implementation - many of 
which persisting, at least formally, until the end of the Estado Novo - were being defined throughout 
the first two decades of the regime in a pragmatic way1. The majority of those instruments, were 
consigned in a very clear way, in its fundamental texts. The Constitution of 1933 and the Estatuto 
do Trabalho Nacional  - ETN - (National Statute of Labour) would legitimize the economic 
intervention of the State, define the corporatist economic organization and express the objective of 
economic nationalism2. In this context, the industrial conditioning was introduced and implemented. 
It would constitute a device to control the process of industrialization crystallized in theLei do 
Fomento e Reorganização Industrial (Law of Industrial Development and Reorganization) of 1945, 
and would define the role of the Colonies. The priority given to the monetary and financial stability, 
one aspect which would remain as a structural guideline of action of the political leaders of Portugal 
in this period, also dates from the early thirties.  
As we shall see, the inevitability of a larger international economic integration (felt at the turn 
of the 1950s to the 1960s) meant a greater vulnerability to external shocks. As a consequence, 
adjustments in certain aspects of the policy, hitherto implemented, and of their means, as well as 
the pragmatic overcoming of certain indecisions, were triggered. To maintain financial and monetary 
stability would also become a difficult task towards the end of the period, nevertheless, no 
sufficiently active policies of adjustment were implemented, as we will explain below.  
 
 
2.2. The environment of the Second World War  
 
The recovery from the war environment was relatively fast and little dramatic, mainly when 
compared with that of the European belligerent countries, despite some inevitable difficulties and 
some less consistent actions on the part of the State3.  
________________________ 
1 For a synthetical view of the economic policy of the Estado Novo during the 1930s and 1940s, see NUNES; BRITO: 1992 
and VALÉRIO: 1994, specially pp. 469-476. 
2 In the constitutional text of 11th April 1933, articles 14th, 16th, 18th, 19th (corporatist organization), 30th (economic 
nationalism) and 31st (''rlghts and obligations [of the State] of superior coordination and regulation of the economic and 
social life") stand out; in the text of the ETN, approved by D.L. (decree-law) no. 23048, of 23rd September 1933, articles 
2nd (economic nationalism), 7th (legitimacy of the economic intervention of the State), 40th (trend for integral corporatist 
organization), are prominent.  
3 “[Adding to] the role of the exogenous conditionalities of the Portuguese economic conjuncture of war (...), the structural 
vulnerability of the Portuguese economy to which inadequate economic policies were added, taken at the wrong time or 
hesitant in there implementation'' ROSAS: 1990, p. 289. The agricultural policy and its negative effects in output and 
agricultural productivity and in the scarcity of goods on one hand, and the late rationing of certain products on the other 
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To this situation, the following made a significant contribution:  
i. The Portuguese neutrality in the conflict and the absence of destruction of factors of 
production;  
ii. The overall prosperity as a result of exports of tungsten and of the increase in the flow of 
capital and remittances1;  
iii. The absence of a external depreciation; 
iv. The absence of an impact of the deficits of the public sector accounts in monetary terms2.  
Thus, it was not necessary to use drastic economic policies of stabilization as elsewhere in 
Western Europe, where, for example, monetary reforms and prolonged rationing, besides a massive 
external assistance, were vital.  
With the lifting of the restrictions imposed by the war, it was possible to import again. The 
government decided to use the reserves accumulated during the war, resulting from the positive 
balances of the balance of payments, to return supply to normality through the increase in imports, 
especially during 1947. Imports rose in real terms by 52.4% in 1946 and by 34.3% in 1947. This 
measure made possible the rapid reduction in inflation (from 11.2% in 1946 to 2.5% in 1947 and to 
a negative rate of 1.2% in 1948), notwithstanding being associated to a significant increase in the 
deficit of the public sector accounts, namely in 1947 and 1948. Inflation would remain thereafter at a 
low level (1.8% on average until 1958, according to the GDP deflator), whereas during the same 
period the consumer prices index would have grown at an annual average rate of 0.6%.  
The reduction in the deficits of public accounts to insignificant levels was achieved already in 
the 1940s and public accounts would show surpluses just by the beginning of the 1950s, a situation 
which would prevail until the end of the decade. The exchange rate remained stable with the 
exception of a devaluation of only 15% in 1949, at the time of the devaluation of the pound sterling 
by approximately 30%.  
This stance also proves the absolute priority given by the regime to nominal stability, which 




hand, seem to provide an example of some of the least successful measures. See again ROSAS: 1990, pp. 187-192 and 
288-198. 
1 These factors of prosperity did not result in high rates of inflation, at least in relative terms; prices only doubled and the 
money supply trebled, despite the surpluses in the balance of payments, and even in the balance of trade, between 1941 
and 1943. 
2 This fact was due to the possibility of financing the mentioned deficits by resorting to the domestic public debt - even in 
excess of needs - as an instrument of anti-inflationary policy, as opposed to what had occurred during the First World War, 
when loans from the Bank of Portugal were used with a consequent boost to the money supply. 
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2.3 The accomodation within the international economic order  
 
The end of the war and its immediate aftermath, within the context of an effort to stabilize and 
recover brought an effort to the creation of an international economic order capable of achieving 
those objectives.  
The participation of Portugal in this effort was limited. By the end of the 1950s, Portugal was 
not yet either a member of the IMF, or of the IBRD/World Bank (both off shoots of the Conference of 
Bretton Woods held in 1944), had not participated in the Conference of Havana to attempt to create 
the ITO in 1947, and was not even a member of GATT. Significantly, Portugal would only become a 
member of these institutions at the beginning of the sixties.  
Nevertheless it would accept the help of the Marshall Plan1, and for that, it was one of the 
earlier members of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation - OEEC (1948) and of 
the European Payment Union - EPU (1950), institutions undertaking the cooperation among 
countries which benefited from the Administration for Economic Cooperation.  
From the political and geo-political points of view, Portugal, despite being a founder member 
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO - in 1949 only joined the United Nations - UN -  in 
1955. 
In what concerns the relationship with its colonies, Portugal moved away from international 
trends, remaining a colonial empire until 1974. This fact, regardless of the constitutional (1951) and 
legal (1961) reforms having altered some aspects of the colonial statute2, would provoke a colonial 
war of important economic consequences.  
 
 
3. The short-term macroeconomic policy  
 
The near absence, and the inefficiency, when implemented, of short-term macroeconomic 
measures during the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1970s, seem to be good 
examples of the economic policy of the Estado Novo after the Second World War. Only on rare 
occasions did this turn to be potentially adverse to the Portuguese economy.  
The limited intervention of the government at this level may have been due to two sets of 
factors3:  
________________________ 
1 Despite the reluctance which made the Portuguese government to refuse the amount of assistance relating to the first year. 
 2 The constitutional reform of 1951 renamed the colonies as “overseas provinces”. In 1961 the indigenous populations, until 
then subject to legal discrimination, were considered Portuguese citizens of full rights. See MATA; VALÉRIO :1994, p. 
201. 
3There are also other reasons given for the limited action of the political leaders in this context. Among these it is worth 
noting the weight of agricultural activities in gross domestic product - GDP - during  the first part of the period under 
analysis, and as a consequence, the effects of short-term crisis represented above all, the result of natural causes 
conditioning bad agricultural years. See AMARAL: 1986 p. 50. 
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i. To the fact that the objectives usually aimed at, namely to fight and control unemployment 
on the one hand, and the external imbalance on the other hand, did not really represent serious 
economic problems in Portugal. During nearly the entire period under analysis, the legal emigration, 
and mainly the clandestine emigration, added to the military conscription after the beginning of the 
1960s, solved the potential problem of unemployment. Actualy these variables would become a 
push factor over the general levels of wages and prices which were felt in the last phase, 
particularly after 1964. Also the sustained surpluses of the balance of payments, despite the chronic 
deficits in the balance of trade, eliminated any concern with this matter. The concerns were going to 
be, as we shall see, of a structural nature: the financing of the development and industrialization 
policies, and of the colonial war. Year after year, from the 1960s on, in the definition of the criteria of 
priorities for public expenditure included in the Lei de Meios (Law of Resources - the parliamentary 
guidelines for the state budget), those two concerns were expressed. Their importance was 
confirmed both in the structure of the public expenditure (of which they represent approximately 
80%), and in the extraordinary expenditure (of which those items weighted approximately 95% of 
the total), as shown in the reports of Conta Geral do Estado - CGE - (Public Accounts)1. 
ii. The ideological conviction of governments of the indispensability of financial2 and monetary 
orthodoxy, and consequently the distrust of Keynesian policies. This idea is repeatedly underlined 
by the various Ministers of Finance throughout the entire period under analysis3 and confirmed in 
________________________ 
1 As an example, we quote what is referred on this subject in the report of the CGE of 1971 p. LIV: "According to the basic 
principles of financial administration defined in the successive Leis de Meios, the first place in the determined order of 
preference encompasses the expenditures with national defense, namely those aimed at safeguarding the territorial 
integrity of the Nation, and the public sector investments anticipated in the prioriy section of the III Plano de Fomento 
(Development Plan III).  As second and third priorities to comply with, when making public expenditures, the economic 
and financial assistance to the overseas provinces and other investments of economic, social and cultural nature followed. 
In connection with other criteria of priorities established, the expenditures with defense and the expenditure with total 
investments assume (...) particular relevance in the fiscal year  of 1971 (...), respectively 41.8%, and 28.8%, of the global 
value (...)". 
2 One of the objectives of this policy is to cover a significant portion of extraordinary expenditure (basically incurred to 
maintain the colonial war, and to a lesser extent, public investment) with ordinary revenue thanks to the tight control of 
ordinary expenditure. This capability increases significantly after 1965, when that cover rises from slightly over 2/5 to 
approximately 2/3 in 1966, entirely financing the costs of war. 
3 Regarding the world economic climate of 1953 and the Portuguese performance, Águedo de Oliveira wrote in 1954: "In the 
meantime, the financial policy capable of being up to what was happening and facing the emergence of a lagging or 
depressed context, was the stimulation of employment, the development of public construction work, and the acceleration 
of the internal circulation including that of the overseas territories. For that, resources earned when times were good had to 
be used to help when times were difficult [...]. One should not aggravate fiscal charges, unless in exceptional 
circumstances, which, nevertheless, in this country could never have been said to be heavy. Credit facilities to the 
construction industry should have been maintained. It was natural to work on the implementation of the Plano de Fomento 
whose aims concurred with the counter cyclical policy [...]." And a little further down comments: "Mr. Colin Clark placed 
too much trust on a policy of administration deficits [...]; he recommended the revulsion instead of the remedy. But in this 
particular case, we had the lesson of history, we had a firm idea and an experience that could not be shaken". [CGE: 1953, 
p.IV]. The memory of the financial and monetary disturbances of the Primeira República  (the regime installed between 
1910 and 1926) lasted a long time. The partial bankrupcy of the State in 1891 is also present in another aspect of the 
exacerbated concerns with the stability of the finances of the State, namely the control of debt, especially the external debt. 
In 1968 Ulisses Cortez congratulates himself for, since 1964, having increasingly moderated the resort to the capital 
markets notwithstanding the increase in the costs of public investment and of the war [CGE: 1967, p.LIX]. However, the 
evolution of the total public debt, particularly the external debt, shows a first significant jump in 1958, a fact which will be 
linked to the beginning of the implementation of the II Plano de Fomento (Development Plan II) and another much more 
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the more recent analysis about Keynesian ideas and their introduction and dissemination in 
Portugal1.  
This did not prevent, during the 1960s and early 1970s, after a decade of high surpluses, the 
recording of considerable deficits in the public accounts, well above those of the years of 
normalization after the war. The financial demands of maintaining the war in the colonies are the 
main cause of this situation, and the fiscal reform, gradually introduced between 1958 and 1964, 
may not have helped. The reform and the intensification of international economic relations have 
altered the tax structure in terms of its relative importance (the weight of custom duties diminished 
and that of taxation over production and domestic transactions  increased by more than that of 
direct taxes) but the overall fiscal burden did not increase, which may have remained between 1957 
and 1965 within the range of 9.5% to 10.3% of GDP, with a slight rise to 11.5% until the beginning 
of the 1970s2. Besides, it failed in some essential aspects such as the taxation of the effective real 
profits of large companies and the limitations of tax evasion (RIBEIRO: 1990, pp. 31-32).  
Regarding the monetary and exchange policy, the intervention of the State was governed by 
objectives of stability of domestic prices and equilibrium of external payments, and consequently the 
maintenance of a strong currency. The second of these objectives was fully achieved, whereas the 
first would slip away after 1964-1965. Any of these objectives was conditioned by the sustained 
surpluses (or small deficits, with the exception of the years of normalization immediately after the 
war and of 1961) of the balance of payments already being accrued during the war. 
The exchange rate of the escudo remained unchanged between 1949 and 1971. This does 
not surprise because Portugal behaved from an early stage in accordance with the rules of the 
international monetary system  - IMS - defined in Bretton Woods - despite having only joined the 
International Monetary Funf - IMF - and the World Bank in 1961, as stated above. It is nevertheless 
significant that during the more serious crises of that system, the escudo had increased in value 
relatively to the currencies with an anchor role within the international monetary system, namely in 
1949, in relation to the pound sterling, and in 1971, in relation to the dollar3. As we shall see, the 
 
pronounced jump in 1962 when the colonial wars began. See for detailed information MATA; VALÉRIO: 1994, pp. 273-
274. 
1 In the Seminar of the Department of Economics of the ISEG to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the publication of the 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, of J.M. Keynes, Ernani Lopes in his communication relating to the 
modernization of the Portuguese economy, and J. Ferreira do Amaral in his related comments, have underlined this fact. 
The former mentioned: "[...] the Portuguese State [...] was rather out of focus with the global outlook of Keynesianism in 
terms of concept and instruments of economic policy, namely in what relates to budgetary policy. To exemplify, the use of 
a systematic budget deficit as a means of short-term regulation, was not an unequivocal element of economic policy" 
(LOPES: 1986, p. 43);  the latter underlined: "[...] the policy of public finances [...] was a rather orthodox policy, turning 
out to be an instrument of economic policy which was not suitable to be used from a Keynesian point of view" 
(AMARAL: 1986, p. 50) In this context also see BASTIEN: 1989 especially pp. 452-456. 
2 For systematic quantitative information on the public accounts see the appendices on  MATA; VALÉRIO: 1994. The same 
conclusions are drawn in NUNES: 1990, p. 41, but with values of a different magnitude: "the reform did not increase the 
fiscal burden. Discounting the contributions to social security, taxation amounted in 1960 to 15.5% of GDP and 15.7% in 
1965.  
3 As a matter of fact, at the time of the devaluation of the pound sterling of 1949, despite the large weight, still existing at that 
time, of Great Britain in the trade relations of Portugal, the government has decided to accompany only partially the 
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behaviour of the exchange rate at the beginning of the 70s was not opposed in due time, bringing 
adverse results to the national economy.  
As regards the control of increases in domestic prices by means of the control of money 
supply, and particularly of credit, it was extremely ineffective. The existence of structural causes for 
the phenomenon1 may not have facilitated the success of macroeconomic policies in this context.  
The measures introduced throughout this period, either the increase in the discount rates of 
the Bank of Portugal after 1965, first from 2% to 2.5%, in 1969 to 2.75%, reaching 5% by the end of 
1973, or the alteration in cash reserves2, did not allow the control of monetary expansion3. This was 
mainly conditioned by two factors of a structural nature: the increase in the availability of gold and 
foreign exchange at the issuing bank, which had an accentuated expansionary effect, and the 
banking credit which, in view of the structure of the financial market and the operation of the capital 
markets, forced a persistent dislocation of the demand for funds to the money market and induced 
the increase in its supply4. It should be noted that the levels of liquidity and solvency of the 
commercial banking sector were always, or most of the time, rather high.  
Surprisingly, the great passivity of the macroeconomic policy - budgetary, monetary or 
exchange - took place at the beginning of the period as well as during the months preceding April 
 
devaluation of that currency (approximately 30% in relation to the dollar) by devaluing by only 15% against the dollar. 
When the IMS collapsed in 1971, the gold and currency reserves accumulated as a result of persisting surpluses in foreign 
payments, forced a revaluation of approximately 13% in relation to the dollar in the following two years. 
1 Among the structural causes for increasing prices after 1964, on the side of demand, are noted: the increase in GDP per 
capita (related to the increase in wages and salaries), the increasingly growing level of foreign remittances (mainly as a 
consequence of the accumulation of high emigration flows), and the increase in tourism revenues. On the side of supply, 
besides the increase in wages and salaries - over and above the levels of productivity - are noted the insufficiency of some 
sectors such as food and construction and, after 1967, the insufficient productive investments. 
2 D.L. n°46492 of 18th August 1965 and D.L. no. 47910 of 7th September 1967. 
3  According to a statement of professor Jacinto Nunes in Público of 25th April 1994, p.12, despite the belief of the Bank of 
Portugal that it was necessary to increase interest rates, the guidelines were for not doing so as a means of continuing the 
inducement of economic growth. The option may have been for a non-inflationary incomes policy, Though it turned out to 
be insufficient. 
4 Both the reports introducing  the public accounts and, above all, those of the Bank of Portugal, repeatedly complain about 
the inoperability of the financial and capital markets and its consequences, and regularly announced the introduction of 
ample measures deemed efficient for the solution of the problem, but, except in the 70s, without producing the desired 
effect. Reading the reports of the Bank of Portugal and BARBOSA: 1990 a very precise and comprehensive idea is gained 
of the sequence of the legislation introduced in relation to the financial and banking systems. On the 7th September 1967, 
some measures to complement and substitute others dated from 1965 were introduced: see D.L. no. 46302 of 27th April 
1965 on the activity of quasi banking institutions, and especially D.L. no. 46492 of 18th August 1965, which regulates the 
operations of the banking system and of the capital markets, and includes dispositions to complete the D.L. no. 44432 of 
the 29th June 1962 towards the formalization of the Bank of Portugal as a true central bank and, as such, with direct 
responsibility for the functioning of the monetary and financial systems. In the CGE of 1967, p. xxv, is stated: "With the 
purpose of promoting the improvement of the monetary-financial mechanisms, [...] with prominence to the [legal 
documents] aimed at regulating the credit system and the insurance of export credits [D.L. no. 47908], the creation of the 
Serviço de Centralização de Riscos de Crédito  (Service of Centralization of Credit Risks) [D.L. no. 47909], the 
adjustment of the legal framework of cash reserves and the guarantees of the responsibilities of commercial banks [D.L. 
no.47910] and the discipline of the framework of interest rates. [Port. no. 22876]". Also the year of 1969 would introduce 
measures in this context worth noting, for which we refer: the D.L. no. 48948 of the 3rd of April, which regulates credit 
transactions of medium term with a special regime for the commercial banks, the D.L. no. 48953 of the 5th of April, whlch 
alters the structure of the Caixa Geral de Depósitos Crédito e Previdência  - CGDCP -  towards the reinforcement of its 
autonomy through its transformation into a public company, and the D.L. no. 49273 of 27th September which creates the 
Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa (Portuguese Financial Society). Also in that year, the Bank of Portugal has started to 
quote preferential rates of rediscount for credit transactions. 
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1974. This type of intervention denoted on the one hand, a great detachment from, or a lack of 
sensitivity to the international environment (even when explicit references are made to the existence 
of problems and some cautious measures are attempted) and, on the one hand, an adherence 
(sometimes exaggerated) to the financial, monetary and exchange orthodoxy.  
Let's consider as examples, two situations in well differentiated phases of the period under 
analysis which prove what we have been saying.  
In the first decade after the second world war, it has occurred the loss of control of the 
sustained and increasingly creditor position of Portugal within the European Union of Payments, 
since its creation and until the first two months of 1952. Such a situation would require drastic 
measures to curtail exports and generally, to control the exchanges of goods and capital1. The 
effects of the Korean War, mainly in the increase of demand and on the rise of prices of certain raw 
materials, including those of the colonies, has implied the significant reduction of the trade deficits of 
Portugal with countries of the EPU2. This state of affairs was further aggravated by the movement of 
invisibles and by the parallel free marketʼs transactions (outside the control of the Bank of Portugal), 
forcing two enlargements of the quota  initially  attributed  to Portugal.  The accumulation of credits 
to the EPU, given that they are not convertible credits, has reduced our imports from other regions 
but did not prevent the Bank of Portugal from placing means of payment in circulation in accordance 
with the "favourable" behaviour of foreign trade inducing inflationary pressures. At the beginning of 
1951, the fact that the leaders of the EPU called attention to the need to introduce measures to 
control (and reverse) the situation3 did not produce practical results.  
The changes in the economic environment and in the international economic order during the 
first few years of the 1970s had a negative impact on the Portuguese economy leading to the clear 
aggravation of the economic problems still before the middle of 1974. Particularly the effect of the 
rise in the international prices of raw materials, especially the price of oil, created inflationary 
pressures, the worsening of external imbalances, the deceleration of the economic activity. This 
recession and the fall in emigration increased unemployment. The contraction of external markets 
has reduced exports, the economic recession of developed countries has reduced tourism (also 
discouraged by the higher prices of transport), the remittances and the demand for labour (resulting 
in the significant reduction in the Portuguese emigration); the rise of oil prices, and of raw material 
________________________ 
1 The D.L. no. 38659 of the 28th February 1952 ended up by prescribing measures opposed to the very objectives of the EPU 
(the liberalization of transactions of goods and invisibles under the principal of non discrimination, and as a consequence 
of the increase in the number of transactions and employment). The decree establishes restrictive measures of a monetary 
nature (retaining partially or totally the amounts exported according to the cumulative position of Portugal and their 
liberation according to the reversal of the trend towards the growth of credits to the organization) and direct control of 
exports, despite Portugal being a country with deficits in foreign trade with countries of the EPU and of the need to 
increase imports to feed the process of industrialization and economic growth. 
2 The colonies were included among the countries of the EPU; the fact that the balance of trade with the colonies was 
positive has reduced the trade deficit even further. 
3 "it was then apparent to the Committee [managing the EPU] that some measures internally undertaken, such as the policy of 
restricting credit, which made imports more difficult, the rise in custom duties, the low level of imports of our overseas 
territories and the absence of measures aimed at curtalling the capital flight in our country, were not of a nature as to 
induce the change in direction of our balance, neither, at least, to slow down the pace of its rise". LEAL: 1952, p. 35. 
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and food, meant the rise in prices of our imports which, besides being directly reflected in the 
external disequilibrium, had repercussions in the level of domestic prices.  
The negative effects  of  this  state  of  affairs  in  the monetary and capital  markets  as  a  
result  of the reactions of the commercial banks and of the collapse of stock market prices, was 
reflected in the expansion of and demand for credit,  in unfavourable expectations,  with negative 
consequences in the rate of savings, in negative passive  interest rates  and in the preference for  
less liquid assets.  Therefore,  "during this period following the oil crisis, the monetary policy 
appears to have been too passive.  Three  reasons  may explain  this  attitude: [...]  the statistics of 
the situation at that time were still  poorer  and  later  than  they  are  now  [...],  the political  
situation  was  tense  and  therefore  difficult [...], a  powerful  tradition  of  prudence  had  been 
inherited  and  the  very  instruments  of  intervention legally available were not too many" (SOUSA; 
1989, pp.149-150). There was no direct control of the volume of credit, and the rise in the active 
rate of interest may not have dampened the demand for credit. On the other hand "the outbreak of 
the oil crisis apparently did not have, any effect on the budgetary policy. The pace of growth of 
public expenditures does not appear to have been affected, neither, their nature” (SOUSA: 1989, p. 
151). Finally, the capital flight apparent after December 1973 also did not trigger any kind of 
reaction, namely, no alteration (devaluation) of the exchange rate or the direct control of the sale of 
currencies took place.  
 
 
4. The structural economic policy  
 
The preoccupation with industrialization as a means of achieving modern economic growth, 
clearly assumed after the war1 , was accompanied by the concern of the State with control and 
regulation of the means and the results of this process, both at the economic and social level, so 
that a development allegedly "harmonious and prudent" could be guaranteed. The centralized way 
in which this intervention was undertaken would, nevertheless, be conditioned in view of the greater 
complexity of the economy and of the social and political environment  generated after the middle of 
the 1960s (SILVA: 1984, p. 28 and MOURA: 1973, pp 37-40)  
It is reasonable to break down the structural intervention of the State during this period into 





1 Law no. 2005 of 11th March 1945 marks the assumption of industrial development as a vital need for the country. On the 
subject of the decisive role of the environment of the second world war to "free the obstructions in the way of 
industrialization" see  BRITO: 1989, p. 160-l63 and ROSAS: 1994, pp 451-455. 
2 See LOPES: 1996, specially pp. 267-283, for a good short survey of this matters. 
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4.1.  The limits to competition 
 
The regulation of the economic activity, characteristic of the policy of the Estado Novo after 
the war, rested on pillars defined in the very peculiar context of the thirties which, as already 
mentioned, would be maintained until the 1970s notwithstanding some minor alterations. Out of 
these pillars, are noticeable the corporatist organization and the industrial conditioning on the one 
hand, and the protectionism on the other. Initially they were considered to be vital (BRITO: 1989, p. 
24-25) to achieve sustained economic growth and development, however the internal and external 
circumstances and events would end up by placing those pillars under question throughout the 
1960s (MOURA: 1973 pp. 37-39).  
This aspects mentioned represent institutional means to limit competition, considered to be 
detrimental to the social and economic development, if "unregulated"1.  
 
 
4.1.1. The corporatist organization 
 
The corporatist organization appears as the general format for state economic regulation 
which, replacing the market, would be capable of "disciplining" competition through "its 
regulation"(BRITO: 1989, p. 99-105) within a wider ideological context in which the participation of 
the state is reserved to "important functions of orientation, direction and supervision of economic 
activities" (BRITO: 1989, p. 51). From a doctrinal point of view, the construction of the Portuguese 
economic corporatism would be based on the free association of economic agents  - the so called 
self-direction or corporatism of association - considered to be the best way to guarantee the 
compatibility of interests potentially more conflicting, either at the level of sectorial structures or at 
the level of class. Actually, as it would be recognized by the formulators of the ideological and legal 
framework of the system, it was the State that has ended up by imposing it. This has reduced the 
participation of the corporatist institutions and of economic coordination to a mere consultative role2 
and to the activities of "typical employers and trade unionist associations, whose function is the 
defense of the respective interests through the regular negotiation of adjustments to prices and 
wages (BRITO: 1989, p. 134), and led to the use of alternative mechanisms to fulfill the other 
________________________ 
1 This attitude relating to competition is already evident in the explanation given by Salazar for the crisis of 1929 (NUNES; 
BRITO: 1992 p. 316 and especially note 22), mainly in basic texts of the corporatist State, namely in the Constitution of 
1933, (art. 31 and 34) and in the ETN, art. 7. The constitutional revision of 1971 (Law 3/71 of 16th of August) had already 
included in the economic model enforced at the end of the 1960s, modifications in the format of the initial position taken 
in relation to competition when it refers among the objectives for the action of the State: "To stimulate private enterprise 
and effective competition, whenever it contributes to the rationalization of productive activities". FRANCO; MARTINS: 
1993, pp. 120-132 presents an interpretation of the corporatist economic constitution. 
2 About the criteria underlying the integration of economic activities in corporatist organizations, hierarchy and causes for the 
difference between formal and real participation in the determination of economic policy, see LABISA; GARCIA: 1966, 
pp. 75-78. 
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functions formally attributed to these institutions. This is the case of acting in the context of the 
control and organization of production, in which industrial conditioning is noted, and even in the 
establishment of administrative prices (despite price fixing being considered "a core function of the 
corporation")1.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the "harmonization/conciliation of interests undertaken through 
the corporatist organization has generated a climate conductive to specific or tacit agreements of all 
kinds with the purpose of reducing or eliminating whatever little competition might still exist" 
(SOBRAL; FERREIRA: 1985, p.15). It has even created "centres of power which, circumscribed in 
the direction of the guilds of the corporations (...) in some important sectors (...), tended to 
perpetuate situations of power which thrived more on the plots of political and administrative 
influence than on the social and economic values of the companies they represented" (BRITO: 
1989, pp. l04-105).  
 
 
4.1.2. The regulation of industry 
 
Despite some ministers2, with direct responsibility for the economic action of the State during 
the period under analysis, having expressed their views on the negative effects of domestic 
protectionism, and especially on the regulation of industry3, it would formally remain in place until 
the 1974.  
The regulation of industry was created in the economic context of the depression of the early 
thirties as one aspect of the policies to fight the crisis4. It was justified mainly by the need to avoid 
unregulated and potentially adverse competition, in the sense of both its economic consequences 
(overproduction and the breakdown of prices) and its social mechanisms (especially 
unemployment5). Nevertheless, far from being a temporary rule, this mechanism has ended up by 
being one of the pillars of the State to regulate the process of industrialization, as it came to be 
________________________ 
1 Corporatist prices were partially replaced by the direct intervention of the State in some markets, particularly the 
agricultural market, where prices were set by the administration. The integration of various funds existing in several 
corporations and institutions of economic coordination, led in 1957 (D.L. no. 36501 of 9th September) to the creation of 
the Fundo de Abastecimento (Supply Fund) with the main objective of supporting part of the cost of some essential 
consumer goods as a means of reducing their prices. Among these goods we count cereals, fertilizers, dried cod, and 
certain cattle breeding products which, together with the corporatist control of trade unionist activities, has ensured until 
the middle of the sixties the maintenance of low wages. The effort to contain prices also led to the intervention in various 
non-agricultural markets. The practices of internal and external protection are, naturally, an indirect means of state 
intervention in the determination of prices. 
2 Namely the cases or Daniel Barbosa and Ulisses Cortez; see BRITO: 1989, pp. 175-176. 
3 Mainly because of the lack of incentive to technological and organizational innovation which it would induce. 
4 In reality, specific legislation for some industries in a situation of crisis during the late twenties (such as milling in 1926, 
resinous in 1927, canned fish in 1928) preceded the Dec. no. 19354 of 14th February 1931. 
5 The other aspects mentioned as objectives of the regulatory action are those of avoiding the "de-nationalization" of the 
industry and its inadequate geographic distribution.  
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defined by the Law no. 2005, Lei do Fomento e Reorganizacão Industrial (Law of Industrial 
Development and Reorganization) of 15th March 1945. 
Whilst being a mechanism of economic rationality - and consequently of modernization of 
industrial structures, either through the incentive to redimension units of production, or to stimulate 
the spread of technical and organizational progress  - only with the legislation of 1952 (Law no. 
2052 of 11th of March), which introduced the "technical regulation" to substitute the "regulation of 
production, did the mechanism undertake that role.  
The last significant alteration to industrial regulation took place in 1965. Dec. Law no. 46666 
of 24th November has enlarged and adapted its application to the Portuguese economic space, and 
simultaneously liberated and restricted the scope of its application.  
The evaluation of the application of the industrial regulation is made in detail on the basis of 
case studies in BRITO: 1989 and CONFRARIA: 1992. Naturally, it is not appropriate to reproduce 
here their analysis, which otherwise reveals important sectorial and chronological peculiarities in 
terms of policy instruments and their consequences. It is only worth noting the fact that those 
conclusions point to the regulations having, generally speaking, tended to limit competition and 
protect the least efficient producers, with consequences in terms of corporate and sectorial 
structures, and naturally, on the overall behaviour of the economy.  
 
 
4.1.3. Protectionism   
 
Protectionism would constitute, together with the industrial conditioning at the domestic level, 
a mechanism of intervention and state regulation in the implementation of the industrialization policy 
and in the fostering of economic modernization, as delineated after the war.  
The objective of economic nationalism defined and implemented in the depressed context of 
the beginning of the thirties, led to very high levels of protectionism throughout that decade. The 
import duties represented then between 1/4 and 1/3 of the volume of imports. This project would 
stand until the III Plano de Fomento1 associated to policies of import substitution and of creation of 
basic industries. Only then, for the first time, was the clear option for the opening of the economy 
expressed, within the scope of the "new economic policy" and was the protectionism (in parallel with 
the industrial conditioning and with the agricultural situation) considered to be one of the main 
factors responsible for the unfavourable development of the Portuguese economy.  
However, the results of this policy in terms of level of real protection, according to the 
analysis and the figures in FONTOURA;VALÉRIO: 1994, fall short of the strong  protectionism of 
the thirties.  
________________________ 
1 Actually, until the admission of Portugal to the EEC in 1986, and with the exception of the turning from the 1960s to the 
1970s, the stance of the defence of import substitution may have been maintained, even though during the seventies 
pragmatic reasons linked to the severe external deficits are to be blamed. See FONTOURA; VALÉRIO: 1994, pp. 84-85. 
             
 
16 
In the context of war, and during the period after the war, the levels of protection were 
reduced. The ratio of import/export duties was reduced to values of approximately 1/8 or lower 
during most of the forties, stabilizing slightly below 1/7 between 1949-1962/63. Despite  these  
levels  of protectionism still being relatively high, particularly in relation to the size of the Portuguese 
economy, the admission of Portugal to the OEEC (1948) implied the significant reduction of the non-
tariff schemes. This measure was partially compensated by the rise in import duties for other 
economies. Even so, the protection against foreign competition given to some basic sectors (such 
as the steel sector), in line with the policy of import substitution, may have been secured largely by 
non-tariff mechanisms (administrative quotas and other restrictions). The protectionism of this 
period  typically  fits into this model1. Even export oriented sectors, such as those of textiles and 
clothing, have been protected.  
After 1964, the levels of protectionism rapidly decreased to much lower levels. Ten years 
later  duties represented less than 1/15 of total imports. 
It should be noted that, notwithstanding, the trend towards the reduction in the limits to 
competition - either by the reduction of tariff proteccionism or by restricting the application of 
industrial conditioning after the middle of the 1960s -, would remain throughout this period since the 
defence of competition was not effectively regulated. As a matter of fact, the attempted legislation 
was never introduced during this period2. If, on the one hand, at least in theory, the membership of 
the EFTA, at the minimum may have pushed in that direction, on the other hand, it has provided an 
escape from it with the special conditions granted to Portugal regarding the introduction of new 
products and sectors, and the extended time frame allowed to accomplish trade liberalization in 
what concerns Portuguese industrial products. Moreover, the principles defined in the Stockholm 
Convention, should not interfere with particular economic instruments of the member countries, to 
whom it was given the freedom to define the legal frameworks appropriate for specific 
circumstances. Only in special cases, difficult to assess, in which the causal relationship between a 
specific behaviour and the contraction (or stagnation) of trade in the area covered by the ETFA 





1 High levels of protection for consumer goods but relatively low levels for capital goods. 
2 The draft Law no. 508/VIII of 23rd December 1964 ended up by being withdrawn by the government itself; the Law no. 
1/72 published on 24th March 1972 was the result, on the one hand, of the introduction at the time of the constitutional 
revision of 1971, of paragraph no.6 of article 31 of the Constitution regarding the power of the State to create incentives to 
private enterprise and to competition, and, on the other hand, the agreements with the European Economic Community - 
EEC - and the European Coal and Steel Community - ECSC - which came to be signed in 1972 (and would came into 
force on the 1st January 1973); this Law, nevertheless, would never be implemented. For more details, see SOBRAL; 
FERREIRA: 1985 especially pp. 105-112. 
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4.2.  Planning  
 
The introduction of the Portuguese planning during the period under analysis was the result of 
three factors:  
i. the very positive assessment, both at the economic and at the financial levels, of the 
achievements of the investment projects made under the Lei de Reconstituição Económica (Law of 
Economic Reconstitution), which covered the period from 1936 to19501; 
ii. notwithstanding, the clear perception of the insufficiency of its results in terms of standards 
of living and modernization of the economic structures (to which the availability of the very first set 
of national accounts data has contributed);  
iii. the fact that, within the context of the reconstruction and recovery of the European 
economy after the war, planning experiments were also introduced in countries with market 
economies2.  
In the analysis of the Portuguese planning experiment in this period, as a mechanism of 
regulation and rationalization of the economic activity, some aspects deserve special prominence.  
i. Both plans introduced until the mid sixties (the first implemented between 1953-1958 and 
the second between 1959-1964) were actually a combination of public investments of a partial and 
sectorial nature, much in line with the Law of Economic Reconstituition, but capable of being 
organized by ranking. In the Development Plan II, for the first time, general objectives were defined 
and quantified and quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic behaviour of the Portuguese 
economy between 1950 and 1958 were introduced. The investment policy still gives a significant 
emphasis to the area of infrastructures (transport,  communications and electricity), notwithstanding 
the doubling of the weight of basic industries in the Development Plan II. In the Development Plan I, 
the weight of classified investments in the agricultural sector was still considerably larger than that 
of the industrial sector, where the steel, oil refining, nitrate fertilizers, tin, and cellulose and paper 
were prominent3.  
Despite the fragility of the technical means and the partial nature of these initial plans, this is 
the phase where the state showed both capability to implement and control those means and 
"political determination". With the Plano Intercalar de Fomento (Intermediate Development Plan) - 
1965-1967 -, when it is really possible to talk about true indicative planning since, we are already 
facing an integrated and global plan, however, the political control has diminished concomitantly 
with the increased complexity of the economic and social situation. The colonial war, on the one 
________________________ 
1  For a detailed analysis of this Law, and particularly of its implementation, see NUNES; VALÉRIO: 1983. 
2 According to ROLLO: 1994, pp 265-269 the membership of Portugal of the OECE and the resort to the Marshall Plan, with 
the inherent need to develop economic cooperation, led to the preparation of plans of economic development between 
1947 and 1951, which may have had a positive influence in the preparation of Development Plans after 1953. 
3 In NUNES; BRITO: 1992, pp. 323-330, and in ROSAS: 1994, pp 455-470 a more detailed analysis of the Development 
Plans, of their links with the industrial policy and with the models of economic growth implemented throughout this 
period, can be found.  
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hand1, and the increased power of some economic and financial groups on the other hand, have 
unleashed contradictory economic interests and reduced the effective capability to act upon and 
articulate the plan which "was reduced to an exercise of mere macroeconomic coherence with some 
sectorial development, provided it did not undermine other interests"2.  
Besides the methodological and technical innovations already mentioned, the Plano 
Intercalar de Fomento introduces some aspects worth noting. As regards its objectives, it shows for 
the first time the apparent concern with inequalities of income distribution, reflected in the inclusion 
of sections connected with social needs (the cases of housing and health). It nevertheless explicitly 
recognizes the subordination of the objective of narrowing the uneven regional development 
(despite being sensitive to the question of location of industrial plants); this was only going to be 
included in the III Plano de Fomento. As regards industrial policy, changes in the means of its 
implementation are revealed. The announcement of the revision of industrial regulations (taking 
place in 1965) and of the measures to protect competition (never introduced) on the one hand, and 
the increased opening to foreign capital (resulting in the approval of the Code for Foreign 
Investment) on the other hand, represent the main changes to the setting towards the reinforcement 
of the role of private enterprises, the strengthening business structures, and the demands of foreign 
competition.  
The III Plano de Desenvolvimento reinforces the inclusion of social sectors, the concern with 
inequalities of income distribution, and with the uneven regional development, leading to the 
creation of the administrative organization of regional planning, and specifically, to the definition of 
plan-regions3. On the other hand, it encompasses the turning assumed in the model of economic 
development towards the opening of the country, drawing a negative balance of the consequences 
of protectionism and of industrial conditioning (as well as of the agricultural performance).  
ii. The real impact of economic planning in the Portuguese society, outside the scope of this 
analysis, was limited by some uncoordinations, namely between the plan and the public budget, 
between the plan and the economic situation (NUNES: 1968), between the "technical structure" 
responsible for the preparation of the plan and the institution responsible for its funding (the Ministry 
of Finance). The absence of control of its execution, of long term planning, and of effective social 
participation and harmonization are also important qualifications.  
iii. During this period, the planning did not count with an entrepreneurial public sector in the 
productive sphere. The corporatist organization, despite accepting and defending the intervention of 
________________________ 
1 In the Plano Intercalar de Fomento  (1965-1967) p. 6, when the reason for a  shorter life span plan is explained (uncertainty 
of the economic, social context), it is also stated as the first priority for the "nation", over and above any other of its needs 
and "aspirations", the "defense of the country". 
2  See SILVA: 1984 pp 28-29 where, on this subject, she says: "it is equally evident that the articulation with the plans of 
large companies and the effective interference in domains as fundamental as scientific and tecnnologlcal investigation has 
been left out of the national plan". More specifically about the political context, see ROSAS: 1994 pp. 539-551. 
3 Dec. Law no. 48905, of 11th March 1969. 
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the State in the economy, did not accept its operation directly in the productive spheres1. As a 
matter of fact, the entrepreneurial public sector of the State during the period ranging from 1945 to 
1973, with the only exception of the creation of  the Banco de Fomento Nacional (National 
Development Bank) - Dec.Law no.41957 of 13th November - , was made up by the a savings bank, 
the Caixa Geral de Depositos and by the post office, Administração dos Correios e Telégrafos, 
created in the 19th century; it should be noted that both these institutions were linked to the services 
sector.  
 Nevertheless, during this period, companies of a mixed nature came into being in 
several sectors (including some industrial sectors) with a significant participation of the State. The 
National Steel Industry ("Siderurgia Nacional”) is probably the most prominent2.  
 
 
4.3. The external integration of the economy  
 
The restraining of competition, mentioned above, has developed within the more 
comprehensive context of the external integration of the Portuguese economy. It is for that reason 
also important to analyze the foreign economic policy, its options and its conditionalities.  
In what concerns the political choice for the integration of the national economic into much 
wider spaces three alternatives were feasible: 
i. the imperial preference, defined during the 1930s when the depressed international 
environment did provide incentives for such an option, and of which the Colonial Act of 19303 was 
its most clear expression;  
ii. The linkage with Europe, whose integration process had started within the context of the 
reconstruction after the war, namely with the creation of the OEEC and of the EPU, and would 
accelerate and deepen still during the 1950s with the creation of the EEC and the EFTA;  
iii. The integration in the world economy actually existing since the turning of the century and 
potentially assumed to be the only relevant supranational space.  
Throughout this period, the indecision was only incident over the first two alternatives, that is, 
between the assumption by Portugal of its inevitable peripheral condition in the European space, 
and the affirmation of its position at the centre of a smaller economic space - its colonial empire.  
Actually, the decision in favour of Europe was forced by pragmatic and economic reasons, 
but only in 1971.  
________________________ 
1 Art. no. 6 of the ETN states that "the State must renounce the commercial and industrial exploitation, even when it is 
designed to, partially or totally, be used to provide public services, whether competing with private enterprises, or being of 
an exclusive nature".  
2Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (Portuguese National Airlines), Metropolitano de Lisboa (Lisbon Underground), Rádio 
Televisão Portuguesa (National Television Network) are other important cases in point. 
3 Dec. no.18570 of 7th July. As for its objectives its social and economic context in general, see SILVA: 1992, pp. 359-367 
and ROSA: 1994, pp. 283-287.  
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Until the beginning of 1960s, the objectives and means of coordinating and integration of the 
economy in the Portuguese imperial space did not suffer important changes in relation to what had 
been established in the 1930s1. It is only worth mentioning the reinforcement in some of the 
colonies of the public investment, channeled mainly to transport infrastructures and to hydroelectric 
equipment, after 1953 (simultaneously with the Development Plan I) keeping pace with the private 
sector investments (of protected groups), in some sectors such as food, cement, transport and 
banking.  
In the 1950s trade with the colonies reached 20% (its maximum) of the total foreign trade of 
Portugal. This shows the inevitability of the importance of trade relations with the OEEC and the 
OECD - more developed economic spaces - in the context of the effort towards industrialization and 
growth. 
As a matter of fact, the membership of the Economic Free Trade Association - EFTA - may 
not have been the favorite choice, but it was the recognition of the impossibility of disregarding 
European markets, especially, at that time, the British market. Actually, EFTA was the least 
demanding option (probably, for that reason, the only one feasible from the economic point of view) 
and meant financial assistance to the process of industrialization and modernization of Portugal. On 
the other hand it was compatible with the desire to maintain economic control over the colonies2.  
If this could have been doubted, the beginning of the 1960s would confirm such a choice. 
Firstly, by the decision to formally maintain the colonial empire, implying the financial effort of the 
colonial war; secondly, by the decision to build up the "Portuguese economic space"3, namely a free 
trade area and a monetary system for the area of the escudo. This effort lasted, however hard, 
approximately ten years. It was the impossibility to keep it working that has clearly led to the choice 
for Europe4.  
________________________ 
1 Notwithstanding the D.L. no. 34643 of 1st of June 1945 regarding the establishment of industries in the colonies, changes 
were mainly in the administrative, judicial and financial areas. From them stands out: the constitutional reform of 1951 
(Law no. 2048 of 11th June), which extinguished the "Portuguese colonial empire" in an attempt to disguise its existence 
and avoid the political isolation of the regime facing an international consensus for decolonization; the Lei Orgânica do 
Ultramar Português (Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Territories) of 1953 - Law no. 2066 of 27th June -, which 
rationalizied the financial administration of the colonies; and the Estatuto dos Indigenas Portugueses das Provincias da 
Guiné, Angola e Moçambique (Statute of Portuguese Indigenous Populations of the Provinces of Guinea (Bissau), Angola 
and Mozambique) of 1954 - D.L. no. 39666 of 20th May -. Further details in ROSAS: 1994, pp. 487-489. 
2 For more details about the creation of the EFTA and the causes for the membership of Portugal of that association, see  
NUNES; BRITO: 1992, p. 329 and FONTOURA; VALERIO: 1994, p. 84. 
3 D.L. no. 44016 of 8th November 1961. The D L. no. 44703 of 17th November 1962 sets out the system for compensation 
and territorial payments in the Portuguese space. 
4 The monetary system was characterized by the formal adoption of one single currency - the escudo - and for distinct 
monetary circulation in each space - “metropolitan” Portugal and each one of the “overseas provinces” - which, in this 
way, configurated truly separated national economies. In practice, this really implied different monetary units, but the 
exchange rates fixed at the parity of 1 to 1, without the possibility of a devaluation even in the case of structural problems, 
preserves the fiction of one single monetary unit. In order to face short-term problems, the Fundo Monetário da Zona do 
Escudo (Monetary Fund of the Zone of the Escudo) - a clearing among the nine national economies - was created. To face 
structural problems, that is, the structural deficits of the balance of payments of some of the “overseas provinces”, since 
the use of devaluations was not possible, the solution was the limitation of free and automatic convertibility with payments 
staggered by order of priorities. In practice, this situation created a tunnel of exchanges and ended the fixed parities of 1 to 
1 - since money payments were only made with long delays and consequent costs (promoting schemes of corruption).  
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5. Conclusion    
 
Besides the macroeconomic policies of stabilisation, the effort of reconstruction after the war 
in Western Europe led to economic policies which have unleashed structural changes. The increase 
in non-market forms of economic regulation, namely indicative planning, the nationalisation of some 
companies and sectors, and schemes for retirement and social security implied more State 
intervention. Those means were presented as both a way of channeling investments, altering the 
sectorial structure of the economy and thus enhancing growth, and of undertaking a more equitable 
redistribution of income.  
Portugal followed those trends in what relates to the concerns with growth and the means to 
achieve it. There are now many studies drawing the balance of the economic policy (or economic 
policies) introduced during the approximately thirty years following the Second World War. Some 
recent studies produce a detailed quantitative analysis, either in aggregate terms or in structural 
terms, of the evolution of the Portuguese economy during that period. NUNES; MATA; VALERIO: 
1989, NUNES; BRITO: 1992, NEVES: 1994, FONTOURA; VALÉRIO: 1994 are some of them. 
Being unreasonable to repeat the analysis given in those studies, we simple leave some 
fundamental conclusions.  
It seems to be beyond doubt that the period after the war brought sustained economic 
growth, that is, high average annual rates of growth of GDP and GDP per capita (during the period 
under analysis, approximately 5.5%), associated with an increase in trade liberalization (average 
rates of growth of exports and imports of 7% and 8% respectively and the significant reduction in 
the levels of tariff proteccionism).  
During almost the entire period, this growth was compatible with financial stability (only 
exceptionally the deficit of public accounts has reached values above 1% of GDP, and, despite the 
trend towards the increase in public debt after the beginning of the 60's, the average for the period 
may not have reached 25% of the product); with external equilibrium - actually a minimal revaluation 
of the escudo against the pound sterling and mainly against the dollar - and with low levels of 
unemployment (below 2%).  
This growth induced a clear process of convergence towards the most developed economies 
of the world economy (MADDISON: 1990).  
 
 In 1971, for political reasons, a solution for the accumulation of payments in arrears was found: protectionism (provisional 
at the beginning, but ending up by being definitive), which implied the significant rise in the prices of “metropolitan” 
Portugal goods and, as a consequence, the fall in the imports of the “overseas provinces”. It was an economic solution for a 
financial problem.  
The problem of the "arrears" was the outcome of the accumulation of the chronic and growing deficits of the colonies, 
particularly of Mozambique and mainly of Angola. This situation was created by two types of factors: a) the increase in 
imports coming from “metropolitan” Portugal as a result of the emigration of “metropolitan” Portuguese to those 
territories; b) the transfer to “metropolitan” Portugal of part of the salaries of military personnel stationed there and of part 
of the savings of the settlers.  
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As regards the schemes for social security and retirement, health and education, their 
incidence and scope was slow to spread in Portugal1. It is today clear that the distribution of wealth 
and income and the general concerns with unevennesses, including those among regions, was 
sacrificed to the objectives of growth until very late. The evolution of the structure of demand and 
income clearly demonstrates that assertion2. Anyway, there are signs of actions taken towards the 
implementation of social policies - CARREIRA: 1996. In the structure of public accounts, between 
1946 - 1958 the weight of social expenditures may have increased from 4% to 10%, decreasing to 
8% between 1959 - 1973. On the other hand, the Ministério da Saúde  (Ministry of Health) and the 
Ministério das Corporações e Segurança Social (Ministry of Corporations and Social Security) were 
established.  
Nevertheless growth did not overcome the many persisting inefficiencies and imbalances, 
reflected particularly in terms of the pattern of specialization, of inequalities in the distribution of 
incomes, and in the regional unevenness, leading many to believe that growth and the mechanisms 
that fed it, were insufficient "to eradicate poverty, to achieve acceptable standards of living, to 








1 The differences among the regimes which, immediately after the war, have thought out and implemented these measures 
may have certainly influenced this aspect. The democratic regimes of Western Europe came out of this process stronger, 
and socialist and labour governments took control, whereas Portugal has maintained an authoritarian conservative regime. 
2 Out of the components of demand, private consumption has diminished during the period under analysis from 77.9% in 
1952 to 69.3% in 1973. The weight of salaries in national income, never raise above 50% during the same period (NEVES: 
1994, p.71 tables 18 & 19). 
3 SILVA: 1984, p. 26. 
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